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Moral Foundation Theory and the Law 
Colin Prince† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Rather than pursue knowledge, the objective of normative work in 
general, and moral reasoning in particular, seems much more di-
rected at defending one’s prior, subjective views.  The game is to 
never give in no matter the evidence arrayed against you . . . .1 
Professor Ronald Allen thus laments the current state of moral debate.  
His remark highlights the problem—moral debate is polarizing and in-
tractable.  Debaters simply entrench themselves in their opinions and 
view their opponents with disdain.  In everyday life, this sort of debate 
has little impact beyond frustrating the participants.  But when the partic-
ipants are lawyers or judges, and the debate occurs in a courtroom, in-
tractable moral debate impacts the parties and the law in egregious ways. 
Our Supreme Court, in particular, exhibits the symptoms of col-
lapsed moral debate.  In the last three terms, the Court has produced 5–4 
decisions at an alarming rate—30% in 2006, 17% in 2007, and 29% in 
2008.2  This division certainly has not gone unnoticed by scholars; Pro-
fessor Chemerinsky noted that, in the 2007–2008 term, “never did one of 
the four most conservative Justices . . . vote for a more liberal result in a 
case defined by ideology.”3  Moreover, the Court has set new lows for 
                                                 
† Candidate for J.D., Seattle University School of Law, 2010.  Thanks are due to Professor Jonathan 
Haidt and Jesse Graham for providing the graphs used in this article.  Any errors in describing their 
work are mine.  Also, thanks go to Megan Farooqui (for her editing prowess), Gretchen Hoog (for 
her moral support), and Lorrie Rigsby (for sharing an office).  But especially, thanks to Keith and 
Carolyn Prince; they’re far more helpful than they should be.  
 1. Ronald J. Allen, Moral Choices, Moral Truth, and the Eighth Amendment, 31 HARV.  J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 25, 27 (2008).  Professor Allen, demonstrating his frustration, writes,  “Scholarship of 
this sort is tedious, providing sufficient reason in and of itself, in my subjective opinion, to ban it 
from constitutional discourse.” Id.  Moreover, “[n]one of the endless efforts to provide general theo-
ries of judging and of legislating and of the meaning of the law is worth a damn.”  Id. at 29. 
 2. Posting prepared by David Carlson for Cornell University Law School Legal Information 
Institute, Supreme Court 2008–2009 Term Highlights, http://topics.law.cornell.edu/supct/suprem 
e_court_2008-2009_term_highlights (last visited Apr. 24, 2010). 
 3. Erwin Chemerinsky, When It Matters Most, It is Still the Kennedy Court, 11 GREEN BAG 
427, 428 (2008). 
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the tone of its opinions.  The primary example being (of course) Boume-
dienne v. Bush, where Justice Scalia claimed the majority’s opinion 
would “almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.”4  This 
Comment attempts to show not only how judges and lawyers can avoid 
the pitfalls of intractable moral debate, but also how to use moral argu-
ment more effectively.  To do this, we will look at a theory of morality 
presented by a group of psychologists led by Professor Jonathan Haidt of 
the University of Virginia. 
Haidt and his fellow researchers present a framework of morality 
that does three things: organizes moral categories, explains the roots of 
those categories, and predicts which moral arguments may carry weight 
with certain listeners.  The psychologists call this framework “moral 
foundation theory.” 
Moral foundation theory argues that there are five basic moral 
foundations: (1) harm/care, (2) fairness/reciprocity, (3) ingroup/loyalty, 
(4) authority/respect, and (5) purity/sanctity.5  These five foundations 
comprise the building blocks of morality, regardless of the culture.6  In 
other words, while every society constructs its own morality, it is the 
varying weights that each society allots to these five universal founda-
tions that create the variety.7  Haidt likens moral foundation theory to an 
“audio equalizer,” with each culture adjusting the sliders differently.8  
The researchers, however, were not content to simply categorize moral 
foundations—they have tied the foundations to political leanings.  And it 
is here that moral foundation theory becomes a truly practical tool for the 
lawyer. 
Professor Haidt’s research shows that liberals, when making deci-
sions, tend to heavily weigh the first two foundations—harm/care and 
fairness/reciprocity.9  Self-identified conservatives, on the other hand, 
tend to base moral judgments on all five foundations equally—including 
ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity in the calculus.10  
                                                 
 4. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 5. Jonathan Haidt & Jesse Graham, When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Mor-
al Intuitions that Liberals May Not Recognize, 20 SOC. JUST. RES. 98, 99 (2007). 
 6. Id. at 104. 
 7. Id. at 99 (“Cultures vary on the degree to which they build virtues on these five founda-
tions.”). 
 8. Id.  See also Jonathan Haidt, What Makes People Vote Republican, EDGE, Sept. 9, 2008, 
http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/haidt08/haidt08_index.html. 
 9. Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt & Brian A. Nosek, Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Dif-
ferent Sets of Moral Foundations, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1029, 1029 (2009). 
 10. Id. 
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Liberals thus tend to use a narrower range of the moral spectrum than do 
conservatives.11 
Further, Haidt suggests that it is this discontinuity between the 
foundations that liberals consider and the foundations that conservatives 
consider that leads to moral polarization and intractable arguments.  As 
Professor Haidt puts it, when conservatives express concerns based on 
the ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity foundations, 
liberals hear only “theta-waves”—that is, nonsense.12 
This Comment will use moral foundation theory, and the recogni-
tion of this discontinuity between the liberal and conservative moral 
foundations, to demonstrate how a lawyer can avoid polarizing and in-
tractable moral debates and become more persuasive in the courtroom.  
To do so, we will look at Kennedy v. Louisiana, where the Supreme 
Court barred capital punishment for child rape.13  I chose Kennedy be-
cause the facts of the case touch clearly upon all five moral foundations 
and because the jurisprudence itself, as we shall see, is so clearly based 
on moral judgment.  Through reading Kennedy, I will present both a gen-
eral and a specific thesis: generally, lawyers and judges should use moral 
foundation theory to analyze moral motivations, and specifically, the ma-
jority in Kennedy failed to do this and thus reduced the persuasiveness of 
its opinion. 
Part II will more fully explain moral foundation theory and its evo-
lutionary roots.  Part III will present the facts and law of Kennedy and 
discuss the moral foundation implications.  Part IV will look at how the 
use of moral foundation theory can tailor arguments to carry more persu-
asive weight. 
II.  SUMMARY OF MORAL FOUNDATION THEORY 
Haidt presents moral foundation theory not as a revolutionary 
change, but as a more nuanced version of previous moral theories.14  This 
Part will first outline each of the five moral foundations and discuss their 
evolutionary purposes.  I will then look at Professor Haidt’s research on 
how the moral foundations correlate to political leanings.  Lastly, this 
Part will address the role that morality plays more generally in legal de-
bate by touching on Haidt’s theory of moral intuition. 
                                                 
 11. Haidt, supra note 8 (“Democrats generally use a much smaller part of the spectrum than do 
Republicans.  The resulting music may sound beautiful to other Democrats, but it sounds thin and 
incomplete to many . . . .”). 
 12. Haidt & Graham, supra note 5, at 99. 
 13. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). 
 14. See Haidt & Graham, supra note 5, at 98–103 (describing the evolution of moral psycholo-
gy and moral foundation theory’s place in the timeline). 
1296 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
A.  The Five Foundations 
Professor Haidt identifies five moral foundations: (1) harm/care, (2) 
fairness/reciprocity, (3) ingroup/loyalty, (4) authority/respect, and 
(5) purity/sanctity.15  These foundations are, essentially, an umbrella 
covering the entire realm of moral concerns.  Each foundation has its 
own evolutionary history, its own virtue system, and its own limitations. 
1.  Harm/Care 
Haidt states that the first foundation, harm/care, evolved from a ma-
ternal sensitivity to suffering in offspring.16  Over time, this sensitivity 
grew from a mere familial trait to a general dislike of suffering.17 
The harm/care foundation gives rise to specific virtues and vices.  
Under this foundation, societies value kindness and compassion, and 
condemn cruelty and aggression.18  Yet, despite the general tendency to 
regard cruelty and aggression as vices, the theorists note that 
“[c]ompassion is not inevitable; it can be turned off by many forces, in-
cluding the other four systems . . . .”19  For example, cruelty and aggres-
sion may be virtuous when obeying authority or acting out of loyalty to 
the group. 
2.  Fairness/Reciprocity 
The fairness/reciprocity foundation arises from “cooperation among 
unrelated individuals” and “alliance formation.”20  In short, this founda-
tion evolved because cooperative groups held an evolutionary advantage 
over uncooperative groups.21  From this foundation comes perhaps the 
most universally recognized virtue—justice.22  Further, Haidt argues that 
guilt, anger, and gratitude are derived from this foundation.23  Again 
though, foundations may conflict; thus, “self-serving biases” can over-
ride concerns about fairness, harm, and justice.24 
                                                 
 15. Id. at 99. 
 16. Id. at 104. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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3.  Ingroup/Loyalty 
The ingroup/loyalty foundation evolved from “living in kin-based 
groups.”25  Virtues and emotions relating to trust, patriotism, heroism, 
and sacrifice arise in this foundation.26  Here, betrayal, dissent, and criti-
cism of the group are immoral.27  Interestingly, Haidt explains that when 
considering the ingroup foundation, resistance to diversity is understand-
able; it is a weakening of the group.  On the other hand, “rituals that 
strengthen group solidarity (such as the pledge of allegiance)” are viewed 
as virtuous.28 
4.  Authority/Respect 
The authority/respect foundation elevates virtues that facilitate the 
hierarchical social structure.29  By valuing authority and respect, social 
life functions fluidly because the need for physical force and fear de-
creases, replaced by voluntary deference.30  Emotions like awe and admi-
ration and the virtues of duty and obedience reflect this foundation.31  
Failure at the top of the hierarchy, i.e., bad leadership, is condemned.32  
Dissent against authority may be seen as immoral and anti-social.33 
5.  Purity/Sanctity 
The purity/sanctity foundation is an evolutionary by-product of the 
emotion of disgust.34  Haidt states that disgust functions as a “guardian of 
the body.”35  Disgust deters humans from eating rotting meat, feces, vo-
mit, etc., thereby avoiding sickness.36  Over time, however, disgust 
evolved into a social emotion.37  It governs bodily activity: “those who 
seem ruled by carnal passions (lust, gluttony, greed, and anger) are seen 
as debased, impure, and less than human . . . .”38  But those who deny 
bodily impulses?  They are elevated.39 
                                                 
 25. Id. at 105. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 106. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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While the above outlines the five moral foundations, it does not ex-
plain the broader function of morality.  Why have morality at all? 
B.  The Function of Morality: Suppression of Selfishness 
Haidt argues that morality suppresses selfishness and thus enables 
social groups to function.40  To achieve this suppression, morality takes 
two approaches—the individualizing approach, and the binding ap-
proach.41 
The individualizing approach focuses on teaching each person to 
respect the rights of others.42  Haidt argues that the first two founda-
tions—harm and fairness—perform this function, calling them the “indi-
vidualizing foundations.”43  In other words, when people consider the 
harm they might cause or the fairness of their actions, they are motivated 
to act more selflessly.  Haidt makes an interesting analogy: this system is 
“like the legal system writ small.  Society is thought to be composed of 
individuals, all of whom are equal.  The purpose of morality is to protect 
individuals from harming or exploiting each other . . . .”44 
In contrast, the binding approach attempts to suppress selfishness 
by strengthening social institutions.45  By binding individuals into roles 
and duties that “constrain their imperfect natures,” individuals act more 
selflessly.46  Haidt argues that the latter three foundations—
ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity—equate to the 
binding approach.47  The binding moralities are “like the nervous system 
writ large.  Society is thought to be composed of institutions and 
groups . . . .  The purpose of morality is to socialize and reshape individ-
uals who, if left to their own devices, would pursue shallow, carnal, and 
selfish pleasures.”48 
In sum, Haidt argues that morality evolved to suppress selfishness, 
and does so through the individualizing approach (justice and fairness) 
and the binding approach (loyalty, authority, and purity).  At this point, a 
lawyer might find moral foundation theory to be a useful analytical tool.  
However, Haidt’s research produced an interesting connection between 
                                                 
 40. Graham, Haidt & Nosek, supra note 9, at 1031. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt & Sarah E. Rimm-Kaufman, Ideology and Intuition in Moral 
Education, 2 EUR. J. DEV.’TL SCI., 269, 271 (2008). 
 45. Graham, Haidt & Nosek, supra note 9, at 1031. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Graham, Haidt & Rimm-Kaufman, supra note 44, at 271. 
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that of Kant, Mill, and Rawls, focusing on rights, justice, and welfare—
reduces the moral spectrum.56  This narrow conception fails to recognize 
a moral domain encompassing “issues related to food, sex, clothing, 
prayer, and gender roles” that exists outside Western elites.57  And in this 
broader domain, moral violations may occur without harm to anyone.58 
Moral foundation theory, however, does not say that either liberals 
or conservatives are correct in their definitions of the moral domain.  The 
theory only describes the moral domain; it says nothing about what is the 
best definition. 
Moral foundation researchers propose the theory as a way to under-
stand our opponents in the culture wars.59  Haidt offers an example from 
the July 25, 2005, episode of The Daily Show, hosted by Jon Stewart: 
Stewart tried in vain to convince conservative U.S. Senator Rick 
Santorum that banning gay marriage was an injustice.  Quickly rea-
lizing the futility of this effort, Stewart remarked, “It is so funny; 
you know what’s so interesting about this is ultimately you end up 
getting to this point, this crazy stopping point where literally we 
can’t get any further.  I don’t think you’re a bad dude, I don’t think 
I’m a bad dude, but I literally can’t convince you.”  The stopping 
point Stewart felt was the invisible wall separating liberal and con-
servative moralities.  Santorum’s anti-gay-marriage views were 
based on concerns for traditional family structures, Biblical authori-
ty, and moral disgust for homosexual acts . . . .  To Stewart, these 
concerns made about as much sense as the fear of theta waves; it 
was impossible to see why a decent, moral person (or at least not a 
bad dude) would want to violate the rights of a group of people who 
weren’t hurting anyone.60 
For the lawyer though, moral foundation theory provides more than 
just analytical benefits; it provides persuasive ones.  In short, if we know 
the political leanings of the judge or jury, then we can predict which ar-
guments will carry more weight and which arguments may be ignored.  
There are, however, some caveats about moral foundation theory. 
D.  Caveats 
First, the foundations can conflict with each other.61  Therefore, in 
using moral foundation theory as an analytical and persuasive tool, we 
                                                 
 56. See Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., Haidt & Graham, supra note 5, at 111. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 104.  For example, in discussing the harm/care foundation, the authors write, “Com-
passion is not inevitable, it can be turned off by many forces, including the [other foundations].”  Id. 
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must recognize that a given moral question may implicate multiple com-
peting foundations.  The analysis can be messy. 
Second, Haidt emphasizes that the foundations are malleable.  Each 
culture shapes its own value system.  The five moral foundations are just 
the materials used. 
Third, the tendency of liberals to weight the individualizing founda-
tions and conservatives to weight the binding foundations are just that—
tendencies.  Indeed, the theorists recognize that political views are “mul-
tifaceted,”62 and a one-dimensional political spectrum is overly simplis-
tic.63  However, moral foundation theory need not be limited to one di-
mension.  The strength of the theory is that, rather than being restricted 
to a left-right spectrum, it functions in five-dimensions.64  It thus recog-
nizes “‘laissez-faire’ conservatives who prize individual liberty,” as well 
as the extreme political left—socialists and communists—who elevate 
community interest.65  Furthermore, moral foundation theory does not 
suggest hard-and-fast rules where an individual, or an act, may fit cleanly 
into one category. 
Lastly, in order for moral foundation theory to be useful to the law-
yer or judge, we must accept that the moral personality of judges and 
jurors substantially affects their decisions.  Otherwise, moral foundation 
theory is essentially worthless.  This point is not merely academic.  In-
deed, now Chief Justice Roberts famously stated in his confirmation 
hearings that “Judges are like umpires.  Umpires don’t make the rules; 
they apply them.”66  Roberts meant, of course, that he was not a judicial 
activist; his personal opinions did not influence his judicial opinions.  
Rather, he believed that Justices should permit only the Constitution, 
statutes, and precedent to affect their votes. 
We must ask first whether Roberts’s view is desirable, and second, 
whether it is plausible.  As to the first, Professor Michael Moore presents 
a brief outline of why moral reasoning is necessary for a judge.  As to the 
second, Professor Haidt argues that desirable or not, reactionary moral 
reasoning happens. 
                                                 
 62. Graham, Haidt & Nosek, supra note 9, at 1029. 
 63. Id. at 1029–30. 
 64. Id. at 1030. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Opening Statements of Judge John G. Roberts, I Come Before the Committee with No 
Agenda.  I Have No Platform, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2005/09/13/politics/politicsspecial1/13ctext.html. 
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E.  Where Morality Enters the Law 
Professor Michael Moore identifies four areas where morality must 
enter the law.  First, and most simply, we use morality to justify the au-
thority of law.67  Second, morality may enter law explicitly.68  For exam-
ple, the law requires judges in many areas to determine what is reasona-
ble or what process is due.69  Doctrines like unconscionability and good-
faith demand moral analysis.  Third, morality is used in what Professor 
Lon Fuller calls “hard cases”—cases of first impression, cases lacking 
dispositive precedent, cases with conflicting precedent or legal standards, 
cases where the language of the law suffers from vagueness or ambigui-
ty.70  In these cases, a judge must use moral judgment.71  Lastly, morality 
may function as a “safety valve” to override law when, for example, a 
statute’s natural operation would affect an unjust outcome.72 
Thus, although one might decry activist judges imposing their own 
idea of morality, moral reasoning necessarily enters the law.  The idea of 
judge-as-umpire is catchy but faulty.  In any case, Haidt makes a strong 
argument that, desirable or not, morality enters reasoning in an irrational 
way. 
Professor Haidt argues that people largely do not reach moral 
judgments through logical reasoning; rather, they reach judgments 
through post-hoc rationalization.73  His research suggests that rather than 
                                                 
 67. See Michael Moore, Four Reflections on Law and Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1523, 1528 (2007).  In addition, Professor Moore notes that the debate includes Aquinas and St. 
Augustine.  Id. at 1533–34. 
 68. Id. at 1527. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1530–31. 
 71. Id.  “In such cases, what would we have a judge do?  Should he flip coins?  Have trial by 
combat? . . . Surely recourse to morality to decide such cases is not just preferable but obligato-
ry . . . .”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 72. Id. at 1531–32.  Moore offers an example: “A federal criminal statute forbids the obstruct-
ing or retarding of the passage of the U.S. mail—does that require the punishment of a state sheriff 
who arrests a murderer on probable cause if that arrest takes place while that murderer was carrying 
the U.S. mail?”  Id. at 1533 (citing United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1868)). 
 73. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach 
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHO. REV. 814, 814 (2001) (“[M]oral reasoning does not cause moral 
judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has 
been reached.”).  Haidt gives a thought test: 
Julie and Mark are brother and sister.  They are traveling together in France on summer 
vacation from college.  One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach.  They 
decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love.  At the very least it 
would be a new experience for each of them.  Julie was already taking birth control pills, 
but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe.  They both enjoy making love, but they de-
cide not to do it again.  They keep that night as a special secret, which makes them feel 
even closer to each other.  What do you think about that, was it OK for them to make 
love? 
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logically processing facts and computing moral judgments, we simply 
react to moral stimuli.74  Only after arriving at a judgment do we identify 
the facts, weigh the evidence, and seek to support our conclusion.75  The 
reasoning process, Haidt shows, is most often an illusion of objectivity.76  
He calls this immediate, reactionary judgment “moral intuition.”77 
Haidt does not say that logical moral reasoning is impossible; he 
argues only that moral intuition plays a large, if not dominant, role in the 
process of forming judgments.  And, if Haidt is correct, then understand-
ing the moral motivations of judges and juries, and how to engage those 
motivations, becomes especially important.  If lawyers cannot recognize 
and engage the moral foundations on which decision-makers base their 
moral intuition, they are far less likely to create the moral reaction they 
want.  The next Part explores how lawyers may recognize and engage the 
moral foundations using Kennedy v. Louisiana as an example. 
III.  KENNEDY V. LOUISIANA AND THE APPLICATION OF MORAL 
FOUNDATION THEORY 
This Part looks at Kennedy v. Louisiana through a moral foundation 
lens.  It separates the facts and law of Kennedy into their constituent, 
moral categories.  With that basis, it then suggests why the majority opi-
nion is unpersuasive.  In sum, the liberal majority opinion relies (as mor-
al foundation theory predicts) on the harm and fairness foundations and 
fails to sufficiently address the loyalty, authority, or purity foundations.  
Moreover, certain legal tests correlate to certain moral foundations, and 
in doing so, provoke moral responses from the Justices.  As we turn here 
to the facts of the case, the reader may want to pay attention to their own 
moral reactions. 
A.  The Facts 
Patrick Kennedy was sentenced to die for the aggravated rape of his 
eight-year-old stepdaughter.78  As Justice Kennedy wrote for the majori-
                                                                                                             
Id.  Haidt then asks subjects whether the conduct is morally right or wrong.  Id.  The subjects “point 
out the dangers of inbreeding” or argue that “Julie and Mark will be hurt, perhaps emotionally.”  Id.  
When reminded that Julie and Mark used two forms of birth control, and the story clearly states that 
no harm came of the act, subjects “say something like, ‘I don’t know, I can’t explain it, I just know 
it’s wrong.’”  Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. at 815. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008). 
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ty, “Petitioner’s crime was one that cannot be recounted in these pages in 
a way sufficient to capture in full the hurt and horror inflicted . . . .”79 
On the morning of the rape, Kennedy called his employer at 6:15 
a.m. to report that he was unavailable to work.80  Between 6:30 and 7:30, 
Kennedy called again asking a co-worker how to remove blood from a 
white carpet because his daughter “‘had just become a young lady.’”81  
At 7:37 a.m., Kennedy called a carpet cleaning company to request ur-
gent assistance in removing bloodstains.82  At 9:18, approximately three 
hours after he had reported unavailable for work, Kennedy called 911 
and sought medical assistance for his stepdaughter.83 
The extensive injuries required immediate surgery: the rape had la-
cerated the victim’s vaginal wall and separated her cervix from the back 
of her vagina, causing the rectum to invade the vaginal structure.84  The 
rape tore her perineum from the posterior fourchette to the anus.85 
In the weeks following, both Kennedy and his stepdaughter claimed 
that “two neighborhood boys” had committed the rape in the backyard, 
though the stepdaughter reportedly told a family member that she had in 
fact been raped by Kennedy.86  After finding the yard mostly undis-
turbed, recovering Kennedy’s phone calls, and discovering blood on the 
underside of the victim’s mattress, the police arrested Kennedy.87  The 
victim later formally accused him.88  A unanimous verdict followed.89 
B.  Moral Foundation Theory and the Facts 
Moral foundation theory provides a lawyer with a comprehensive 
framework to analyze the moral concerns presented by the grisly facts 
above.  Under the individualizing moralities, the implications are ob-
vious—the harm and unfairness of the rape are spelled out.90  But the 
arguments that a lawyer may present under the binding moralities are 
less obvious.  Kennedy has violated so many sacred institutions: his role 
as a father (ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, purity/sanctity), his mar-
                                                 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 2647. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 2646. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 2647. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 2648. 
 90. Id. at 2658.  The Court, in its discussion, acknowledges both the physical and psychologi-
cal harm: “Rape has a permanent psychological, emotional, and sometimes physical impact on the 
child.”  Id. 
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riage (ingroup/loyalty, purity/sanctity), his position of power (authori-
ty/respect), and he has succumbed to the basest human act (puri-
ty/sanctity). 
By using a moral foundation theory analysis, a lawyer can increase 
the likelihood of presenting the arguments that will carry the most weight 
with the factfinder, and not just the arguments that carry the most weight 
with the lawyer.  For example, if Kennedy were tried in Berkeley, Cali-
fornia, one of the most liberal cities in the country,91 a lawyer would like-
ly focus on arguments rooted in the harm and fairness foundations.  Pa-
trick Kennedy physically tortured the victim and treated her as less than a 
human being.  But, if Kennedy were tried in Provo, Utah, the most con-
servative city in the country, a lawyer would give equal time to argu-
ments rooted in the loyalty, authority, and purity foundations.  Patrick 
Kennedy violated his paternal role, his marriage vows, and his role in the 
community with the most disgusting act a person could perform. 
In sum, moral foundation theory allows a lawyer to recognize that 
the facts and arguments that appeal to him may not be the same argu-
ments that appeal most to the factfinder.  By analyzing which arguments 
engage which moral foundations, and correlating those arguments with 
the moral foundations most likely relied on by the factfinder, a lawyer 
can be more persuasive.  But beyond the facts, a lawyer can identify le-
gal tests that correlate with moral foundations, as demonstrated below. 
C.  Overview of the Law in Kennedy 
In Kennedy, the Supreme Court barred capital punishment in child 
rape cases.  This section presents the law in Kennedy, the Court’s appli-
cation of that law, and what moral foundation theory tells us about the 
jurisprudence. 
The Court’s opinion begins with two general principles: first, pu-
nishment should be proportional to the offense,92 and second, the mean-
ing of the famous Eighth Amendment creed “cruel and unusual” is dy-
namic.93  As the Court puts it: “The Amendment draw[s] its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency . . . ,”94 and, “the standard of ex-
treme cruelty . . . embodies a moral judgment.  The standard itself re-
                                                 
 91. Press Release, The Bay Area Center for Voting Research, New Study Ranks America’s 
Most Liberal and Conservative Cities,  (Aug. 11, 2005) (on file with author) (ranking Berkeley as 
the third most liberal city and Provo the most conservative). 
 92. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2649 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367  (1910)). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (citation omitted)). 
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mains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of 
society change.”95 
In pursuit of these general principles, the Court uses both an objec-
tive and a subjective test.  The objective component asks whether there is 
a national consensus against a punishment.96  The Court gauges this na-
tional consensus by tallying the number of states permitting the death 
penalty for child rape, considering whether there is a trend towards ap-
proval or towards rejection, and inquiring about the rate of actual use.97  
The subjective test—independent judgment—rests largely on the prin-
ciple of proportionality.98  Essentially, the Court must determine if, in its 
view, the punishment fits the crime. 
D.  The Court’s Application of the Law in Kennedy 
Each half of the Eighth Amendment analysis—the national-
consensus test and the independent-judgment test—implicates a particu-
lar moral foundation.  The national-consensus test implicates the authori-
ty foundation, whereas the independent-judgment analysis implicates the 
harm and fairness foundations.  Moral foundation theory predicts, there-
fore, that conservatives will tend to value the national-consensus analysis 
more than liberals.  This section discusses why we should correlate the 
national-consensus and independent-judgment tests with the authority 
foundation and harm and fairness foundations. 
1.  The Court’s Application of the National-Consensus Test 
The national-consensus analysis gauges society’s standards through 
legislative enactments and state practices regarding executions.99  More 
simply, if few states apply a punishment, or do so very rarely, then the 
punishment is likely unconstitutional.100 
The Kennedy Court finds a national consensus against capital pu-
nishment for rape of a child because only six jurisdictions impose the 
                                                 
 95. Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972)). 
 96. Id. at 2650. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 2661 (“Gregg instructs that capital punishment is excessive when it is grossly out of 
proportion to the crime or it does not fulfill the two distinct social purposes served by the death 
penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes.”).  Any deterrent effect the death penalty has, 
however, has become so uncertain that the Court does not directly address it.  See Daniel Kahan, The 
Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 416 (1999) (“Empirically, deterrence claims 
are speculative.”).  Thus, whether a punishment constitutes proper retribution appears to be the sole 
factor in the independent-judgment analysis. 
 99. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650 (“In these cases the Court has been guided by ‘objective indi-
cia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice with respect to 
executions.’”). 
 100. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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death penalty on child rapists.101  Justice Alito’s dissent, however, argues 
that the majority’s analysis is flawed.102  In his view, Coker v. Georgia, 
which struck down capital punishment for rape of an adult in 1977, led 
state legislatures to believe that capital punishment for any crime short of 
murder would be unconstitutional.103  Thus, legislative inaction reflects 
Coker’s shadow rather than any national consensus. 
Moral foundation theory compels us to view the national-consensus 
test as a function of the authority foundation.  As described in Part I, the 
authority/respect foundation is an evolutionary product of “the long his-
tory of living in hierarchically-structured ingroups.”104  Plainly, the na-
tional-consensus analysis itself concedes a hierarchy.  By tallying state 
legislative action as a gauge of the public’s moral compass, the Court 
implicitly acknowledges that it is the public that is the authority in judg-
ing evolving standards of decency, not the Court.  The Court’s role here 
is merely to umpire.  Because the national-consensus analysis involves 
the proper functioning of a decision-making hierarchy, it is thus a moral 
exercise itself, apart from the ultimate issue in the case.  In other words, 
the conservative Justices care not only about the ultimate outcome of the 
case, but also about the test itself as a moral exercise.  Thus, any per-
ceived failure of the liberal majority to properly value the national-
consensus analysis may be viewed by the conservative minority as a 
moral failure, not merely a legal error. 
2.  The Court’s Application of the Independent-Judgment Test 
The Court then turns to the second, subjective half of its analysis—
independent judgment.  The Court, in finding death a disproportionate 
penalty for the crime of child rape,105 considers a number of factors, in-
cluding the roles of retribution and deterrence,106 the effect of the death 
penalty process on the victim,107 and a jury’s capacity to decide fairly in 
the face of such a heinous crime.108  One fact, however, quite simply do-
                                                 
 101. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2653 (noting that the forty-five jurisdictions not permitting execu-
tion for child rape are far more than needed because precedent found national consensuses when 
only thirty and forty-two jurisdictions did not permit the penalty in other circumstances). 
 102. Id. at 2665 (Alito J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court relies primarily on the fact that only 6 of 
the 50 States now have statutes that permit the death penalty for this offense.  But this statistic is a 
highly unreliable indicator of the views of state lawmakers and their constituents.”). 
 103. See id. at 2665–67. 
 104. Haidt & Graham, supra note 5, at 105. 
 105. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2664 (majority opinion) (“These considerations lead us to con-
clude, in our independent judgment, that the death penalty is not a proportional punishment for the 
rape of a child.”). 
 106. Id. at 2661–64. 
 107. Id. at 2662–63. 
 108. Id. at 2660–61. 
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minates the rest: no life has been taken.109  Quoting Coker, the Court 
states that the, “murderer kills . . . the rapist, if no more than that, does 
not . . . .  We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 
‘is unique in its severity and irrevocability,’ is an excessive penalty for 
the rapist who, as such, does not take a human life.”110  Indeed, when 
announcing the holding, the Court ignores deterrence, it ignores retribu-
tion, it utters not a word on the reliability of the jury; the Court relies on 
one factor: “[O]ur holding is that a death sentence for one who raped but 
did not kill a child . . . is unconstitutional under the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments.”111  In sum, the linchpin of the majority opinion is a 
simple balancing of harms—the harm to the victim and the harm to the 
perpetrator.  One must take a life to receive death. 
The conservative wing responds to the independent-judgment test 
in an interesting way, a way that differs slightly from their precedent.  In 
prior death penalty cases, the conservative wing had “emphatically” re-
jected the use of independent judgment.112  But Justice Alito’s dissent 
seems to accept the independent-judgment analysis while simultaneously 
argueing that the Court has strayed far afield of the proper judicial 
role.113  Essentially, Justice Alito acknowledges that the Court must con-
sider, in its own judgment, the fairness of a punishment, but that judg-
ment must be carefully cabined by the authority foundation. 
Now that we have seen how the majority and minority differ on the 
two tests, the moral foundation implications become clear.  For the liber-
al majority, the Court’s independent judgment trumps.114  And the 
Court’s independent judgment demands lex talionis—a life for a life—at 
its most pure.  Anything short of that is unconstitutional. 
                                                 
 109. Id. at 2659 (“[T]he death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the victim’s 
life was not taken.”). 
 110. Id. at 2654 (quoting Coker v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 584, 597–98 (1977) (citation omitted)). 
 111. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650–51 (emphasis added).  The complete quote reads, “[O]ur 
holding is that a death sentence for one who raped but did not kill a child, and who did not intend to 
assist another in killing the child, is unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”  
Justice Alito, as discussed below, will come to the same conclusion.  See infra text accompanying 
note 132. 
 112. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989) (“In short, we emphatically reject peti-
tioner’s suggestion that the issues in this case permit us to apply our ‘own informed judg-
ment’ . . . .”).  See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (In 
applying the independent judgment test, “The Court thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of our Nation’s 
moral standards . . . .  Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any 
more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be determined by the subjec-
tive views of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I dissent.”). 
 113. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2673 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Although the Court has much to say 
on this issue, most of the Court’s discussion is not pertinent to the Eighth Amendment question at 
hand.  And once all of the Court’s irrelevant arguments are put aside, it is apparent that the Court has 
provided no coherent explanation for today’s decision.”). 
 114. Id. at 2650 (majority opinion). 
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This balancing reflects exactly what moral foundation theory pre-
dicts: liberals tend to value harm and fairness above other moral founda-
tions.115  In contrast, the conservative minority opinion, relying on the 
national-consensus test, reflects the importance placed on the authority 
foundation by conservatives generally. 
Moreover, it is here that moral foundation theory provides under-
standing and de-polarizes the debate.  We are inclined to believe that our 
political opponents emphasize the legal tests that get them to the out-
come they want.  In other words, we may believe that the liberal wing of 
the Court is simply anti-death penalty and abuses the independent-
judgment test to arrive there.  Or, we may believe that the conservative 
minority is simply pro-death penalty and therefore abuses the national-
consensus test to arrive where they want.  But moral foundation theory 
suggests an earnestness to both sides’ opinions.  The liberal majority is 
likely to value harm and fairness above other moral concerns; thus, em-
phasizing the balancing of harms is predictable.  And the conservative 
majority is likely to value respect for authority; thus, the emphasis on the 
national-consensus test is predictable. 
E.  Foreign Law 
Noticeably absent from the Kennedy decision is any reference to 
parallel foreign law.116  Three years earlier, in Roper v. Simmons, Justice 
Kennedy referenced foreign law to support the conclusion that capital 
punishment for juvenile murderers was unconstitutional.117  Justice Sca-
lia vigorously dissented: “Because I do not believe that the meaning of 
our Eighth Amendment . . . should be determined by the subjective views 
of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I dissent.”118 
Roper provoked commentary from both academics and the Justices 
themselves.119  The commentary addresses mainly the precedent120 and 
                                                 
 115. See id. 
 116. See generally id. 
 117. Roper, 543 U.S. at 604. 
 118. Id. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia also writes: “Though the views of our 
own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the Court’s decision today, the views of other countries and 
the so-called international community take center stage.”  Id. at 622.  Further,  
[t]he Court’s parting attempt to downplay the significance of its extensive discussion of 
foreign law is unconvincing. “Acknowledgment” of foreign approval has no place in the 
legal opinion of this Court unless it is part of the basis for the Court’s judgment—which 
is surely what it parades as today. 
Id. at 628. 
 119. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and 
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005); Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 
1931 (2008).  See also Justices Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Discussion at the American Uni-
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the rationality of accepting various authorities in general.121  Moral foun-
dation theory, however, provokes us to frame this issue—the appro-
priateness of reference to foreign law—as a fundamentally moral one.  It 
is, of course, quite easy to see how citation to foreign law implicates the 
authority foundation: doing so acknowledges an authority outside the 
hierarchy explicitly permitted by the Constitution.  Such references also 
implicate the ingroup/loyalty foundation. 
Citing a foreign authority appears to reach outside the group.  As 
discussed in Part II, Professor Haidt argues that the ingroup/loyalty 
foundation arose from the “long history of living in kin-based groups.”122  
Virtues and rituals that celebrate group solidarity are valued.123  By refe-
rencing foreign law, a judge seems to prefer foreigners over one’s own 
tribe.  If we accept that moral judgments may arise reactively as moral 
intuitions rather than reasoned conclusions, we then recognize that these 
references to foreign law are likely to cause a morally motivated re-
sponse under the loyalty foundation. 
And this divide has not gone unnoticed.  Professor Noah Feldman 
noted the loyalty underpinnings of referencing foreign law in a 2005 
New York Times Magazine article: 
One view, closely associated with the Bush administration, begins 
with the observation that law . . . derives its legitimacy from being 
enacted by elected representatives of the people . . . .  [T]he Consti-
tution is seen as facing inward, toward the Americans who made it, 
toward their rights and their security.  For the most part, that is, the 
rights the Constitution provides are for citizens and provided only 
within the borders of the country.  By these lights, any interpretation 
of the Constitution that restricts the nation’s security or sovereign-
ty—for example, by extending constitutional rights to noncitizens 
encountered on battlefields overseas—is misguided and even dan-
gerous.  In the words of the conservative legal scholars Eric Posner 
and Jack Goldsmith (who is himself a former member of the Bush 
administration), the Constitution “was designed to create a more 
perfect domestic order, and its foreign relations mechanisms were 
crafted to enhance U.S. welfare.” 
A competing view, championed mostly by liberals, defines the 
rule of law differently: law is conceived not as a quintessentially na-
tional phenomenon but rather as a global ideal.  The liberal position 
                                                                                                             
versity Washington College of Law: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions (Jan. 13, 
2005) (transcript available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/posts). 
 120. See generally Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 119. 
 121. See Schauer, supra note 119, at 1935–40. 
 122. Haidt & Graham, supra note 5, at 105. 
 123. Id. 
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readily concedes that the Constitution specifies the law for the Unit-
ed States but stresses that a fuller, more complete conception of law 
demands that American law be pictured alongside international law 
and other (legitimate) national constitutions.  The U.S. Constitution, 
on this cosmopolitan view, faces outward.124 
Without saying as much, Professor Feldman hit on the moral underpin-
nings of the divide; conservatives tend to favor the loyalty foundation, 
and reference to foreign law is thus “misguided and even dangerous.”  
Liberals hear only theta waves.125 
The true value of moral foundation theory is that it shifts the debate 
from one of precedent and rationality to one of basic moral motivations.  
If we do not recognize that we are debating basic moral motivations, we 
will remain polarized and frustrated. 
IV.  WHAT THE COURT DID WRONG 
I must be frank in saying that I find the Court’s justification for its 
judgment to be disappointing.  Perhaps I was hoping for the imposs-
ible.  Perhaps I was hoping that in reaching the judgment it reached, 
the Court would find philosophical resources undiscovered or un-
tapped by moral, political, and legal theorists . . . .126 
Professor Heidi Hurd is correct: the Kennedy opinion is, indeed, disap-
pointing.  When the Court relies on only the harm and fairness founda-
tions, the persuasive power of the Court’s opinion is only two-fifths of 
what it might be.  By neglecting the loyalty, authority, and purity founda-
tions, the liberal majority allowed the conservative minority to buttress 
their own position.  This Part addresses how the majority might have 
confronted the loyalty, authority, and purity foundations. 
A.  Ingroup/Loyalty 
After reading the Kennedy opinion, one is left with the feeling that 
the law, the Court, and society betrayed the victim.  All three sided with 
Patrick Kennedy instead of an innocent eight-year-old girl.  Upon read-
ing the facts of the case, how can a person not feel angry?  How can a 
person not demand some form of retribution?  The death penalty fulfills 
that demand. 
                                                 
 124. Noah Feldman, When Judges Make Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 28, 2008, at 
MM50, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/magazine/28law-t.html. 
 125. See supra note 54. 
 126. Heidi Hurd, Death to Rapists: A Comment on Kennedy v. Louisiana, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 351, 351 (2008). 
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We are angry at moral agents because we acknowledge that they 
had the freedom to choose and chose wrongly.  Anger recognizes 
and respects their freedom, holding them accountable for their 
choices . . . Anger underscores the moral community we share with 
victims and criminals.  Crimes have torn the social fabric and de-
mand justice, payback to condemn the crime, vindicate the vic-
tim . . . .  Where there is no anger, there is no justice and no sense of 
community.127 
Professors Berman and Bibas rightfully note that our anger underscores a 
“sense of community.”  And by siding with the rapist, by stating that 
rape is categorically less harmful than murder, the Court seems to say to 
the victim, “it could have been worse.”  This tears at our sense of com-
munity. 
Moral foundation theory suggests that we are evolutionarily primed 
to reject this feeling of betrayal.  But according to Professor Haidt’s re-
search, conservatives will tend to value the loyalty foundation more than 
liberals and will thus give more weight to this feeling of betrayal when 
considering the correctness of the Kennedy opinion. 
Opponents need to counter this feeling of betrayal.  The Court 
needed to express that allowing Kennedy to avoid his death sentence in 
no way weakened society’s anger at the perpetrator or diminished its 
sympathy for the victim.  Society in no way sided with Patrick Kennedy.  
This is not an easy task. 
To perform this feat, the Court could have shifted the emphasis of 
the opinion.  It might have stressed structural reasons for siding with 
Kennedy, as if to say, “the fault lies with our inability to fashion a proper 
system.”  For example, the Court briefly discusses an inability to ensure 
consistent application of the penalty.128  Believing it cannot fashion ag-
gravating and mitigating factors that might constrain an impassioned 
jury, the Court argues that the risk of arbitrary application is high.129  
Thus, there is the feeling that Kennedy escapes his death penalty not be-
cause society has sided with him but because society is simply unable to 
fashion a consistently applied penalty.  In sum, had certain arguments in 
Kennedy been emphasized, the minority’s loyalty concerns could have 
been mitigated. 
                                                 
 127. Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engaging Capital Emotions, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 355, 360 (2008). 
 128. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2660 (2008). 
 129. Id. at 2661.  The Court finds that murder is a more quantifiable harm than rape.  Id.  
“[The] imprecision and the tension between evaluating the individual circumstances and consistency 
of treatment have been tolerated where the victim dies.  It should not be introduced into our justice 
system, though, where death has not occurred.”  Id. 
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B.  Authority/Respect 
Next, capital punishment performs a clear authority-foundation 
function.130  The death penalty re-asserts a social structure torn by the 
perpetrator’s crime.  This argument must be confronted, rather than 
dodged by the Kennedy majority. 
The Kennedy majority should have stressed the precarious role of 
the state in killing its citizens and the need to limit the scope of the death 
penalty.  The Court has previously stated that the death penalty is re-
served for a “narrow category of the most serious crimes.”131  Drawing 
on this maxim, the Court should assert that the state has a tenuous role in 
putting people to death and that the state’s authority to do so must be 
reserved for crimes that unquestionably warrant the penalty. 
Moreover, the majority again underutilizes the argument that per-
mitting the death penalty for child rape increases the threat of arbitrary 
and discriminatory application.  While the arbitrariness argument may 
seem rooted in the fairness foundation, it can also implicate the authority 
foundation.  In other words, the Court could have argued that the arbi-
trary application of the death penalty undermines respect for the laws.  
For example, one of the main benefits of the rule announced in Kennedy 
is that it establishes a reasonably clear line—you must kill in order to be 
killed.  If the Court permits capital punishment for rape, then the law 
must decide what type of rapes will qualify.  Indeed, Justice Alito’s dis-
senting opinion can be turned on itself.  Justice Alito began his dissent 
with the following: 
[The Court prohibits the death penalty for child rape] no matter how 
young the child, no matter how many times the child is raped, no 
matter how many children the perpetrator rapes, no matter how sa-
distic the crime, no matter how much physical or psychological 
trauma is inflicted, and no matter how heinous the perpetrator’s 
prior criminal record may be.132 
So we must ask, of course, how young, how many times, and how much 
torture must a rapist inflict before his acts warrant the death penalty?  
The risk of arbitrary application increases, and as it does, respect for the 
certainty of law falls. 
                                                 
 130. Recall that the authority/respect foundation evolved from hierarchical social structures.  
See supra note 29. 
 131. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
 132. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2665 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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C.  Purity/Sanctity 
The Court briefly implicates the purity/sanctity foundation when 
noting violation of innocence and childhood,133 but the foundation is, 
ironically, the least confronted in a case about rape, childhood, family, 
and the death penalty. 
The Court should have directly acknowledged the difficulty of 
teaching society the value of human life through killing.  The opinion 
never does so.  Nor does the opinion stress the awesomeness of the death 
penalty itself—the state killing a citizen.  While the idea of the sanctity 
of life in general seems relatively minor to the liberal majority in com-
parison with the more convincing argument of fairness, Professor Haidt’s 
research suggests that this argument might carry more weight with the 
conservative minority than believed.  At the very least, some acknowl-
edgment was warranted. 
The arguments above are just a starting point for how the majority 
might have used the binding foundations to strengthen its opinion.  But 
we should note that none of the binding foundations fit clearly within our 
idea of law; they are not based on our ideas of Rawlsian justice; they 
cannot properly be placed into the Eighth Amendment legal analysis.  
Despite this, moral foundation theory suggests that these have value 
beyond what is recognized by the liberal majority. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Commentators have recognized that the true capital punishment de-
bate revolves not around rational thought but around emotional reac-
tion.134  Indeed, there is a growing body of literature devoted to the role 
of emotion and the law generally, and emotion and capital punishment 
specifically.135 
As lawyers, admitting the prominence of moral emotion in the capi-
tal punishment debate might trouble us.  Law, after all, seeks to infuse 
                                                 
 133. Id. at 2658 (majority opinion) (“The attack was not just on her but on her childhood.”).  
The Court also noted that, “‘[t]he immaturity and vulnerability of a child, both physically and psy-
chologically, adds a devastating dimension to rape that is not present when an adult is raped.’”  Id. at 
2677 (quoting Melissa Meister, Murdering Innocence: The Constitutionality of Capital Rape Sta-
tutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 208–09 (2008)). 
 134. See Susan A. Bandes, Child Rape, Moral Outrage, and the Death Penalty, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 17, 17 (2008).  On the role of emotion in constitutional interpretation generally see 
Doni Gewirtzman, Our Founding Feelings: Emotion, Commitment, and Imagination in Constitu-
tional Culture, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 623, 664 (2009) (“It is nearly impossible to discuss the issues at 
the heart of contemporary constitutional discourse—like abortion, homosexuality, the right to die, or 
affirmative action—without implicating moral judgment.”). 
 135. See Gewirtzman, supra note 134, index. 
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reason into criminal proceedings.136  But capital punishment, like so 
many other legal issues, cannot be resolved without recourse to morality 
and the emotions inspired by violations of the moral code.  Professor Su-
san Bandes writes, “[I]t is important to bring emotion into the legal con-
versation . . . emotions help explain why people hold the views they do 
about the death penalty.”137  But where does this leave us?  Recognizing 
that emotion plays a role in legal reasoning is fruitless unless we under-
stand the underpinnings of those emotions.  Moral foundation theory, 
acting like a prism separating moral emotion into its component parts, 
provides those underpinnings.  Once we see what moral foundations our 
opponents value, we can identify the arguments that will carry persuasive 
power with them rather than simply re-hashing the arguments that carry 
the most persuasive power with us. 
This Comment has attempted to demonstrate the legal utility of 
moral foundation theory.  It has looked at how moral foundation theory 
may improve our understanding of the moral motivations at play in Ken-
nedy v. Louisiana and has shown where the majority opinion fell short.  
The limited purview of this Comment, however, should not imply limits 
to the use of moral foundation theory.  Rather, we hopefully see how this 
powerful analytical and practical tool could be used in the debates on gun 
control, terrorism, gay rights, and many others.  In our legal debates, 
moral foundation theory allows us to analyze and categorize the moral 
motivations of the actors.  It allows us to recognize why the arguments 
we find most persuasive may not carry the same weight for our oppo-
nents.  It allows us to predict what arguments we are missing and how 
we might tailor the discourse.  In the end, moral foundation theory is a 
tool of understanding that “illuminate[s] the nature and intractability of 
moral disagreements in the American ‘culture war.’”138 
                                                 
 136. See id. at 668 (discussing dualism—the view that emotion and reason can be and ought to 
be separated).  “This dualism informs the American cultural model for judicial behavior, which 
seeks to minimize emotion’s influence and delegitimizes its role in constitutional interpretation.”  Id. 
 137. Bandes, supra note 134, at 18. 
 138. Graham, Haidt & Nosek, supra note 9, at 1029. 
